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Madden, Michael T. ) LCpv) v 5., The U.S. is scheduled to withdraw from the Philippines by 31 December 1992. Although military planners have long considered the loss of the Philippines as a plausible contingency, most planning assumed sufficient time would be available for orderly withdrawal and subsequent build up of alternate locations.
This paper looks at the immediate problems facing the warfighting commander on 1 January 1993 and, where possible, provides recommendations to reduce his risk in supporting contingencies in the Western Pacific and Persian Gulf regions. 
1
The Scope. This paper will limit its view to the potential logistics shortfalls that will hamper the operational commander from effectively carrying out assigned missions. For perspective, this paper will discuss these shortfalls within a prescribed scenario. This driving scenario is necessary in that it is not reasonable to assume the commander will be afforded time to "muddle" through until long term logistic solutions can be implemented. This paper will assume that the commander is actively supporting or must be positioned to support our toughest logistic mission --a regional conflict somewhere American presence also serves to reassure or remind littoral states of American resolve to exercise influence in the area. Stability and influence in the region is vital to our national survival. Our National Security Strategy outlines several ambitious objectives for this region:
American strategic concerns still include promoting stability and the security of our friends, maintaining a free flow of oil, curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, discouraging destabilizing conventional arms sales, countering terrorism and encouraging a peace process that brings about reconciliation between Israel and the Arab states as well as between Palestinians and Israel in a manner consonant with our enduring commitment to Israel's security. 8 An argument has been presented validating the need for a continued U.S. forward presence and a consistent optempo though the traditional threat --the Soviets --has dissolved. The operational commander still faces a dynamic environment, ripe with possible contingencies and unique threats. The Philippine bases (or the capability provided by these bases) have been key in the ability to project creditable power into these regions.
To gain a perspective on the range and depth of support required to support our prescribed scenario, an understanding of the current capabilities afforded by these bases and the role they played in the last Gulf conflict must be understood.
CHAPTER III OVERVIEW OF CAPABILITIES AVAILABLE IN THE PHILIPPINES
Current Capabilities. Air Base (CAB) was capable of receiving 3,500 short tons of supplies daily. In addition, capability existed to service and repair over 800 combat and supply aircraft at one time. Since there were restrictions on CAB being used to project combat missions for other t'ian the defense of the Philippines, its value was primarily as a logistic staging point. 3 It is reasonable to assume that the loss of CAB reduces excess capacity and the logistic airlift function is adequately handled 7 by Cubi Point Naval Air Station. Can be operated 24 hours a day year round.
Presently performs over 60% of 7th Fleet work.
Handles 20 to 25 ships at one time.
Labor costs for a skilled Filipino work force is 1/7 of that for other facilities in the region.
During the Vietnam War a conscious effort was made to develop a highly capable organic facility, with significant investment in facilities and ongoing workforce training programs made.
Even with this condensed overview, it is easy to gain an understanding of the significant in-theater capability and flexibility available to the warfighting commander to handle a wI, r3' -f co'itinqencies. One noLed author concludes:
The Philippine bases also facilitate a "force multipliec" because fewer ships and planes are needed to provide an equivalent force preseice than if it were restricted to CONUS or US Pacific possessions. This effect was proved throughout the Vietnam War when Subic Bay became the essential fulcrum for projecting U.S. naval and naval air power into the Tonkin Gulf and against North Vietnam.
To have maintained a carrier force in the South China Sea by other means would have been extraordinarily expensive. Navy ship repair facilities in Guam, Yokosuka and Sasebo Japan, as well as commercial yards throughout the region, which could make the trip somewhat shorter, but each has certain limitations that become important in a wartime scenario. "Excess capacity at these other U.S. facilities in the region could accommodate some redeployed forces in peacetime, but existing facilities would need to be expanded or supplemented by new facilities to provide the wartime capability equivalent to the current basing system with the Philippine facilities available.
' "8
The Recommendation. Regardless of the actual presence of these weapons, the Philippine government would be exposed to an internal political dilemma with its own people and an external dilemma with its ASEAN partners. With no clear immediate solution, the warfighting commander is at greatest risk in this area.
For other commodities, consuming the excess capacity at
Guam and at the bases in Japan is a good general strategy.
Carrier based support would most likely move to Japan, due to the deep water port facilities, and AFS (Combat Stores Ships)
final load out would move back to the AFS's homeport in Guam.
Transit times to Diego Garcia from either Japan or Guam would on average increase by 5 days (10 days round trip) and with limited shipping assets resupply frequency could be degraded. Depending on frequency, a portion of stock could in effect be "warehoused" afloat in ships while transiting between the West Coast and forward bases. Singapore from becoming the Philippines of tomorrow:
Our initial relationship with the Philippines was very paternalistic and definitively colonial. We accrued distinct, one-sided, advantages from our negotiations after World War II.
Singapore is an established sovereignty and a strong commercial entity in its own right.
Agreements with Singapore would tend to be of mutual advantage to both countries.
U.S. presence should not rise to the high levels currently in the Philippines. The operation commander may desire to see both of these options developed and utilized. It prevents dependence on any one foreign government and increases operational flexibility in the region.
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